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The United States Marine Corps (USMC) currently
operates a fleet of KC130 aerial refueling tanker aircraft.
This paper uses queuing and simulation models to examine
the USMC KC130 tanker requirement, contrasts the results
and explores the budgetary implications of alternative fleet
requirements. This analysis finds that queuing models
dont account for some of the complexities of aerial
refueling operations. Therefore, queuing models may
miscalculate the KC130 requirement. Simulation models
give a more accurate depiction of actual KC130
requirement. Further, by incorrectly specifying the
requirement the USMC could be faced with significant
operational and budgetary implications.
1 INTRODUCTION
The United States Marine Corps (USMC) currently
operates a mixed fleet of KC130 aerial tanking aircraft,
including series F, R, and T. The F and R aircraft are
approximately 30 years old. The USMC is beginning to
retire these models in favor of new J series aircraft. As the
USMC begins replacing its aging fleet with a newer, more
capable model, it is natural to re-estimate the USMC
KC130 requirement. This paper uses both queuing theory
and simulation to examine the USMC KC130J fixed-wing
aerial refueling requirement. This paper contrasts these
methodologies and explores the budgetary implications of
alternative fleet requirements.
2 AERIAL REFUELING BACKGROUND
The KC130 requirement assumes that the USMC retains
sufficient KC130 capacity to meet USMC organic refueling
requirements during two nearly simultaneous major theater
wars (2MTW). The 2MTW scenario envisions nearly
simultaneous confrontations in both western and eastern
theaters. Defense planning projects the aircraft deployed in
each theater, by week. The KC130 requirement is calculated107for the week when the combined demand for KC130
services is the greatest across both theaters.
The USMC refueling capable fixed-wing aircraft
include:  F/A-18A/C/D, EA-6B, and AV-8B. The CH-53E
helicopter is also a refueling capable USMC aircraft, but
the helicopter KC130 requirement is independent of the
fixed-wing requirement due to operational policies and
technical characteristics of the refueling drogues. (The
USMC KC130 uses a probe and drogue refueling system.
The KC130 trails a hose from each wing, with a basket
(refueling drogue) attached to the end of each hose.
Receiver aircraft are equipped with refueling probes. When
the probe engages the drogue, gas is passed from the
KC130 tanker to the receiver aircraft.) The remainder of
this paper compares alternative procedures for determining
the KC130 requirements for fixed-wing aerial refueling
missions. The USMC KC130 requirement for broader
ranging missions was analyzed in Gates, et al. (1999) and
McCarthy (1999).
Aerial refueling is supported entirely through an aerial
refueling track (hereafter referred to as a track).
Metaphorically speaking, this track is a gas station in the
sky. KC130s orbit in a predetermined pattern waiting for
refueling customers. KC130s are rotated through the track
24 hours per day, providing customers fuel as needed.
KC130 sorties are scheduled to reflect the number of
aircraft to be refueled, the time to engage the drogue and
receive gas, and the number of drogues. The aerial
refueling requirement does not support individual fighter
strike sorties.
Using similar assumptions, the aerial refueling
requirement was previously analyzed in two Center for
Naval Analysis (CNA) reports:  USN/USMC Tanking
Requirements (Cox 1995) and USMC Organic Tanking
Requirements (Wu and Alexander 1996).  These analyses
applied queuing theory to determine the number of
refueling points (hoses and drogues) required on each
refueling track.  Queuing theory uses projected average
customer  (aircraft) arrival rates, average service times
(time required to engage the drogue, receive fuel and5
Gates and McCarthydisengage), and number of servers (drogues), to calculate
the expected wait before customers receive service, the
average number of customers awaiting service, and the
refueling tracks capacity utilization.
These analyses used a standard M/M/S multiple server
queuing model (Anderson, et al. 1997). Both CNA
analyses assumed that five minutes is the maximum
average acceptable waiting period and calculated the
number of servers required to meet this ceiling.
3 AERIAL REFUELING REQUIREMENTS:
QUEUING VERSUS SIMULATION MODEL
Base case aerial refueling assumptions are summarized in
Table 1. Refueling assumptions can be grouped into two
categories:  KC130J performance specifications and aerial
refueling demand assumptions.  First consider performance
specifications. Average customer service times are based
on drogue engagement/disengagement times, fuel pumping
rates and the quantity of fuel delivered. Base case service
times equate to approximately 5 minutes for the average
fixed-wing aircraft. In addition, KC130Js require at least
three hours on the ground between sorties to refuel the
aircraft and refresh and brief the crew. Each KC130J
operates for 12 hours per day, including on-ground time
between sorties. This analysis also assumes that 90% of all
KC130Js are in service (10% are in depot level
maintenance) and 80% of the in-service aircraft are capable
of completing their mission (72% of all KC130Js are
mission capable). Finally, the base case rounds up drogues
on-station to an even number to accommodate whole rather
than partial KC130s.
Table 1:  Base Case Aerial Refueling Assumptions
Value Characteristic
Performance Specifications
5 Maximum Expected Wait  (Minutes)
5 Service Time Per Customer (Minutes)
2.5% Drogue/Hose Failure Rate
5 KC130 Sortie Overlap (Minutes)
180 Time On Ground Between Sorties (Minutes)
12 KC130J Operational Hours Per Aircraft Per Day
72% KC130J Availability
90% KC130J In-Service Rate
80% KC130J Mission Capable Rate
Demand Characteristics
0.338 USMC Arrival Rate Per Minute - West
0.585 USMC Arrival Rate Per Minute - East
2430 Average Fuel Demand (Pounds)
Source:  Gates, et al. (1999).
On the demand side, this analysis uses CNA (Cox 1995)
customer arrival rates and fuel demands. In the base case
scenario, the eastern theater is at peak activity; the west
theater is past its peak. Thus, the east theater uses the CNA107high scenario customer arrival rates. Customer arrival rates
in the West reflect the CNA medium scenario. Refueling
demand continues at an even pace 24 hours per day.
The USMC KC130 requirement can be estimated
using either queuing theory, as in past studies (Cox 1995;
Wu and Alexander 1996), or a simulation model. Unfor-
tunately, queuing models estimate steady-state refueling
track performance, but a refueling track may never reach
steady-state equilibrium. Departing KC130s briefly remain
on-station after their replacements arrive, at least until they
finish refueling their current customers, which periodically
increases the number of available servers. If the overlap is
sufficiently frequent, it may significantly reduce expected
waiting time. Conversely, periodic drogue failures reduce
the number of servers and increase expected waiting time.
This analysis will compare the KC130 requirements esti-
mated by a standard M/M/S queuing model and an aerial
refueling track simulated by an ARENA© multi-channel
server simulation model. (For a more detailed description
of ARENA© simulation models see McCarthy 1999.)
In this comparison, both models assumed two KC130s
on-station in the East and one in the West. Both models
also used the same probability distributions for customer
arrival and service rates. Finally, the initial simulation
excluded drogue failures and the overlapping KC130
sorties (i.e., it maintained one KC130 on-station for the
entire period). Both models projected average customer
waiting time, average number of customers in the queue
and system utilization. Given equivalent assumptions, the
queuing model and initial simulation model should provide
equivalent results, allowing the models results to cross-
validate one another.
Two enhancements were added in subsequent simula-
tions to better reflect actual ARCP performance:  overlap-
ping KC-130 sorties and drogue failures. To simulate
overlapping KC130 sorties, aircraft were rotated through
the refueling track on a 45-minute on-station KC130 flight
schedule, which will be discussed in detail below. During
this rotation, tankers serving customers depart the refueling
track after completing the refueling process for their
current customers. This overlap effectively doubles refuel-
ing track capacity (servers) every 45 minutes. To reflect
drogue failures, ARENA© creates an independent chance
of failure for each drogue every 45 minutes. With a 2.5%
probability, a drogue is seized and blocked for the entire
45-minute period; with a 97.5% probability, the drogue
does not fail. In actuality, drogue failures typically occur
when customers accidentally dislodge the drogue during
the refueling process. Thus, many drogue failures do not
last the duration of the tankers time on-station, as is
assumed here.
Table 2 summarizes the aerial refueling track
performance results for the queuing model and three
simulation scenarios:  no overlapping sorties or drogue
failures; overlapping sorties but no drogue failures; and6
Gates and McCarthyTable 2:  Comparative Simulation Results
















Expected Value 2.2 2.16 1.31 1.46 12.6 12.70 6.38 6.58Time in
Queue
95%  C.I.* - 1.90 - 2.42 1.16  1.47 1.27  1.85 - 9.1616.20 5.50  7.25 5.47  7.70
Expected Value 1.3 1.26 0.77 0.86 4.3 4.38 2.19 2.24Customers
in Queue
95%  C.I.* - 1.10  1.42 0.68  0.87 0.75  0.98 - 3.10  5.66 1.86  2.51 1.85  2.63
Expected Value 73.1% 72.7% 84.6% 85.7% 84.6% 84.9% 90.6% 90.9%Capacity
Utilization
95%  C.I.* - 71.4-74.0% 83.3-86.0% 84.5-87.0% - 82.7-87.0% 88.5-92.7% 89.2-92.6%
*C.I.  Confidence Intervaloverlapping sorties with drogue failures. The queuing
model results are well within the 95% confidence interval
for the simulation model results with no sortie overlap or
drogue failures, cross validating both models. The
simulation and queuing model results would likely become
closer if the simulation period increased beyond 30 days.
Table 2 also indicates that sortie overlap significantly
reduces expected customer time in the queue and average
customers in the queue. Expected time in queue and
average customers in the queue both fall by approximately
40% in the east theater; expected time in queue and
average customers in the queue both fall by approximately
50% in the west theater. Equally as important, drogue
failures only slightly increase expected customer time in
the queue and average customers in the queue:
approximately 11.5% in the East and 2.5% in the West.
The queuing and simulation model results in Table 2
indicate that the USMC should retain at least two tankers
on station in both the eastern and western theaters. Thus,
these models suggest similar KC130 requirements with the
parameters used here. However, the difference between the
queuing and simulation model results is dramatic when the
simulation model includes overlapping sorties and drogue
failures. This suggests that the KC130 requirements could
easily differ with different customer arrival rates or service
times. In fact, carefully considering the results in Table 4
indicates that these models might suggest different KC130
requirements even in this case.
To illustrate, consider the eastern theater. The static
queuing model indicates that steady-state expected queue
time increases to over one hour if one of the four drogues
fails. There is almost a 10% probability that at least one of
four drogues will fail. If a 10% probability of a queue
significantly exceeding five minutes is unacceptable, the
queuing results suggest that the USMC should consider
maintaining three KC130s on-station in the eastern theater.
Unfortunately, this result is misleading. The queuing model
result with three servers (one drogue failure) is a steady-10state equilibrium; as explained above, the queuing system
is unlikely to reach steady-state. Unfortunately, there is no
way for the queuing model to depict the temporary drogue
failures actually expected on a refueling track, or to weigh
these failures against the counterbalancing effects of
overlapping KC-130 sorties.
In contrast, drogue failures only last through the
current KC130 tanker rotation in the simulation model.
Furthermore, simulation shows that overlapping tanker
sorties reduce any queue that has formed during the drogue
failure. Departing tankers could even temporarily delay
their return to base if the queue were unacceptably long
and if they had not issued all their available fuel. The
simulation model indicates that two KC130s provide
sufficient refueling capacity in the East, even with drogue
failures.  Overlapping tanker sorties and drogue failures
will have a larger impact on queuing system performance
as capacity utilization increases, because refueling tracks
are more likely to have longer queues both when drogues
fail and as replacement KC130 sorties arrive.
4 TANKERS ON-STATION (FLOW) VERSUS
SORTIE DURATION (STOCK)
Refueling point performance involves flow and stock
concerns. The queuing and simulation models just
discussed address flow concerns:  is there sufficient server
capacity to satisfy arriving refueling customers in a timely
manner?  The USMC must also ensure that sufficient
stocks of fuel are delivered to the refueling point to satisfy
consumer demand. The stock of fuel delivered per period
depends on both the number of KC130s on-station and the
frequency with which tankers rotate through the refueling
track. Furthermore, these factors are related. For a given
customer arrival rate, increasing the KC130s on-station
increases the potential time on-station per sortie before
each KC130 issues its fuel supply.77
Gates and McCarthyFuel stock considerations require specifying a KC130
flight operations schedule (sortie duration) for both the
eastern and western theaters. The flight schedule is limited
by the twelve hour operational day and must allow for
transit time to and from the theater, one hour pre-flight
preparation, two hours post-flight service and maintenance,
and at least three hours turnaround time between refueling
missions. (These performance characteristics where
provided by CNA (Wu and Alexander 1996), Marine
Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron 1 (MAWTS-1)
and at a KC-130J Tanker Requirements meeting held at
Naval Air Station, Patuxent River, Maryland, 24
September 1999.) Table 3 summarizes the trade off
between time on-station and the number of KC130s
required to support one KC130 on-station 24 hours per
day, before and after incorporating the 72% KC130J
availability. If KC130s remain on-station for 72 minutes,
ten mission capable KC130s are required to provide 24-
hour coverage. Over a 12-hour period, five aircraft provide
continuous coverage by rotating through two sorties per
aircraft; five additional aircraft provide continuous
coverage for the remaining 12-hour period. With 72%
mission capability, this translates into a requirement for 14
KC130s. As the time-on-station decreases from 72
minutes, the aircraft required to provide continuous
coverage increases. With the sortie duration considered
here, KC130s complete two missions per day in all
scenarios and both theaters.
Table 3:  On-Station Time Versus the Number of KC130Js














30 24 3410Using average fuel consumption per customer, the
queuing and simulation models indicate that KC130s can
remain on station for an average of 100 minutes in the
West and 65 minutes in the East, if there are two KC130s
on-station in both theaters. This suggests that the USMC
consider a 72 minute KC130 flight operations schedule in
the West, and a 60 minute flight schedule in the East.
Unfortunately, customer arrival rates and fuel demands are
probabilistic. If actual consumption exceeds average
expected consumption, KC130s will run out of fuel more
quickly than expected. The risk of fuel shortages cannot be
directly explored using average fuel consumption rates.
Crystal Ball©, a simulation software add-in to
Microsoft Excel©, was used to examine how probabilistic
fuel demands affect sortie duration. The sortie duration
model specifies probability distributions for customer
arrival rates and fuel demands. Crystal Ball© uses a Monte
Carlo simulation to select parameter values according to
the specified probability distributions. Excel© calculates
sortie duration for the selected parameter values. (Given
the KC130J performance specifications, 30 minutes is the
minimum reasonable sortie duration, considering drogue
engagement times, fuel pumping rates and the KC130s
available fuel supply. This constraint was built into the
simulation model.) After conducting the predetermined
number of trials, Crystal Ball© reports the simulation
results in several formats.
This analysis considered three scenarios:  lower vari-
ability, base-case and higher variability. The probability
distributions for customer arrival rates and fuel demands
are more centralized around the mean in the lower
variability case, and more spread around the mean in the
higher variability case. The range of fuel demands in the
higher risk case reflects the range of potential demands in
Wu and Alexander (1996). The parameter specifications
are summarized in Table 4.
These scenarios can be interpreted in at least two
different ways. They can represent three possible
descriptions for the relevant customer demand variability,
only one of which describes the actual situation. Presenting
three scenarios indicates the impact variability has onTable 4:  Crystal Ball Sortie Duration Simulation Assumptions
Parameter Distribution Theater Mean Scenario Minimum Maximum
Lower Risk 0 48
Base Case 0 InfiniteCustomer Arrival Rate
(Per Hour) Poisson East 35.1 Higher Risk 0 Infinite
Lower Risk 0 30
Base Case 0 InfiniteCustomer Arrival Rate
(Per Hour) Poisson West 20.3 Higher Risk 0 Infinite
Lower Risk 1500 3500
Base Case 1000 4500
Fuel Demand (Pounds
Per Customer) Triangular Both 2430
Higher Risk 1000 600078
Gates and McCarthyKC130 requirements and refueling track performance.
Alternatively, the three scenarios could represent potential
MTWs (e.g., each scenario represents a potential theater,
where theaters differ in fixed-wing mission profiles, distance
from base to theater, etc.). Here, the USMC would have to
consider all three scenarios and their associated probabilities
to determine KC130 requirements and refueling track
performance. This analysis considers the first perspective.
The Monte Carlo simulation involved 10,000 trials,
representing 10,000 KC130 sorties. With two KC130s on-
station in the East and the base-case customer arrival and
fuel demand assumptions; Crystal Ball© forecasts a 65.34
minute average sortie duration, consistent with the queuing
results (65 minutes). However, sortie duration is 60
minutes or longer in only 53.95% of the trials (Figure 1). If
USMC implements a 60 minute KC130 rotation schedule,
both tankers will issue their fuel supply in less than 60
minutes in just over 46% of the tanker sorties. If the
USMC implements a 45 minute KC130 rotation schedule,
both tankers will issue all their fuel in less than 45 minutes
in approximately 13% of the Tanker sorties. Aerial
refueling customers would be left without fuel in these
cases. In the West base case with 2 KC130s on-station,
both tankers run out of fuel in approximately 13% of the
sorties with a 72-minute KC130 rotation schedule, and
approximately 3% of the time with a 60 minute rotation.
Stock considerations highlight another point.
Maintaining an additional KC130 on-station increases
sortie duration. Increasing sortie duration can compensate
for the additional KC130 on-station, particularly for shorter
sorties. As sortie duration increases from 30 to 45 minutes,
the KC130s required to maintain one aircraft on-station
decreases from 34 to 22 (Table 3). Maintaining three
tankers on-station for 45 minutes requires fewer KC130s
than maintaining two on-station for 30 minutes (i.e., 3*22
= 66 < 2*34 = 68). This tradeoff should be considered in
determining the minimum KC130 requirement.1Table 5 illustrates the interaction of flow and stock
considerations. Flow considerations require maintaining at
least two KC130s on station on both the East and West.
Stock considerations dictate short sortie duration in several
scenarios. As a result, the KC130 requirement is lower
maintaining three KC130s on-station in the East Base
Case, East Higher Risk Case, and West Higher Risk Case.
Table 5:  KC130 Requirement to Meet Server capacity










Limited Risk 3 60 51
2 30 68
Base Case 3 60 51
2 30 68
East
Higher Risk 3 45 66
2 72 28
Limited Risk 3 72 42
2 60 34
Base Case 3 72 42
2 45 44
West
Higher Risk 3 72 42
5 KC130 AERIAL REFUELING
COST-RISK TRADEOFF
The preceding discussion indicates that there are at least
two risks inherent in determining the KC130 fixed-wing
aerial refueling requirement:  flow and stock risks.
However, reducing flow and stock risks by deploying
additional KC130s increases KC130 program costs.
Accommodating higher KC130 fleet costs requiresFrequency Chart
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Figure 1:  Sortie Duration Simulation Results - East Theater, Base Case, Two KC-130s On-Station079
Gates and McCarthyincreasing the program budget. Thus, it is important to
consider the tradeoffs between refueling track performance
and the KC130J requirement and program costs.
As estimated elsewhere (Gates, et al. 1999), the
present value lifecycle cost for one KC130J is $119.2M
(i.e., the cost to purchase and maintain one KC130J over its
life time (40 years), including acquisition, maintenance and
support, expected up-grades, and salvage value or
disposal). (McCarthy 1999, explores the implications using
Crystal Ball© to estimate probabilistic lifecycle costs.) To
illustrate the tradeoff between refueling track performance
and cost, the minimum number of KC130s required to
ensure a given probability of completing scheduled sorties
can be determined for different probabilities of success.
Costs can be calculated for each KC130 requirement.
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between
probability of completing the scheduled sortie and both the
KC130 requirement (left axis) and program cost (right
axis) in Millions of 1999 dollars. (This analysis could use
Crystal Ball© to construct a probabilistic LCC model (see
McCarthy 1999). This would estimate a cost range for each
KC130 requirement. The USMC could then examine the
tradeoff between probability of completing scheduled
sorties and expected cost, as reported here, along with
worst and best case cost estimates.) The data in Figure 2
can help determine the USMC fixed-wing aerial refueling
requirement. Suppose these scenarios represent three
possible descriptions for the relevant customer demand
variability, only one of which describes the actual
situation. If the limited variability case is the relevant
scenario, the tradeoff between cost and probability of
completing scheduled sorties begins increasing after this
probability reaches 85% (70 KC130s). If the USMC
increases the KC130 requirement from 70 to 72 aircraft,
they can increase the probability of successful sortie108completion from 85% to 95%. To increase this probability
to 100%, the KC130 requirement increases from 72 to 85,
which represents an additional $1,550M in LCC.
In the base-case, costs begin increasing significantly
once the probability of successful sortie completion
reaches 85%; costs increase significantly throughout the
entire range in the higher variability scenario. The USMC
may decide to settle for a lower probability of successful
sortie completion if these are the relevant scenarios.
6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Static queuing models, which have been used to estimate
USMC KC130 aerial refueling requirements, do not
incorporate the full complexity of refueling track
performance. Queuing models dont account for either the
impact of overlapping KC130 sorties and drogue failures
on refueling track performance, or the impact of variable
customer arrival rates and fuel demands on sortie duration.
The first issue involves the ability to service aerial
refueling customers in a timely manner (flow); the second
issue involves the supply of fuel available for refueling
customers (stock). Two simulation models were introduced
to address these issues. An ARENA© simulation model
was used to analyze how overlapping KC130 sorties and
drogue failures affect refueling track performance
(expected time in the queue, average customers in the
queue, and refueling track capacity utilization). A Crystal
Ball© simulation model was introduced to assess the
impact of sortie duration on refueling track performance
and the KC130 requirement.
The ARENA© simulation model indicated that
maintaining two KC130s on-station provided a sufficient
flow of fuel in the east theater, vice the three KC130s






















































Figure 2:  KC130 Requirement, One Generation Lifecycle Cost and the Probability of Completing Scheduled Sorties0
Gates and McCarthyfailures). Both models maintained two KC130s on-station
in the West. The Crystal Ball© simulation model illustrated
a tradeoff between sortie duration, KC130s on-station and
the probability of completing the scheduled sortie before
issuing all available fuel. In some instances, it is efficient
to maintain more than the required KC130s on-station.
This increases sortie duration and actually reduces the total
KC130 requirement. More aircraft are required in each
sortie, but fewer aircraft are required to provide the
necessary rotational base. The results of this simulation
model were used to generate tradeoffs between the KC130
requirement and the probability of providing a sufficient
fuel supply at all times. Depending on both the refueling
track performance desired and the variability of customer
arrival rates and fuel demand, the KC130 fixed-wing aerial
refueling requirement ranges between 70 and 120.
Ultimately, the USMC must determine the appropriate
balance between costs and performance. However, this
topic is beyond the scope of this paper.
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